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COMMENT
THE PROBLEM OF MOTIVE IN HATE




Fourty-eight incidents of violence, harrassment, or intimidation
of Arab-Americans occurred in the first month of Operation Desert
Storm.' These incidents are part of a pattern of hate crime2 activity
which began in the 1980's and continues to date.3 While the exact
scope of hate crime activity nationwide is unclear4 , state and federal
authorities, along with minority rights groups, have begun to collect
information on the patterns and frequency of hate crimes. 5 This in-
formation suggests that state and federal efforts have largely failed
to deter hate-motivated violence. 6
I Jennifer Toth, Hate Crimes Increase Since the Start of the War, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7 1991,
at All.
2 "Hate crime" will be used in this Comment to connote crimes ofviolence commit-
ted by individuals who are motivated by hate of another's background.
3 See generally, U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, Recent Activities Against Citizens and
Residents of Asian Descent (1987).
4 Until very recently, there was no system for collecting data on the prevalence of
hate crimes nationwide. Minority rights groups, like the Anti-Defamation League (here-
inafter the "ADL"), and at least one government agency, the Community Relations Ser-
vice of the Department of Justice, have collected information on racially-motivated
violence during the last decade. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, however, reports
that it is impossible to measure whether such violence is on the rise, as many observers
believe. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGrs, Intimidation and Violence: Racial and Reli-
gious Bigotry in America 4-8 (Sept. 1990).
5 Congress recently passed The Hate Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275,
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 158 reprinted in U.S. CODE AND ADMINISTRATIVE NEws,
No.3 (June 1990) (Act requires the Attorney General to collect data on crimes which
"manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation or
ethnicity.").
6 Personal attacks on persons ofJewish descent in 1988 numbered 458, up from 112
in 1980. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 4. The ADL reports 432
incidents of anti-Semitic violence in 1989 while the Gay and Lesbian Task Force reports
885 cases of physical violence against homosexuals in 1989. Amy Bayer, Senators Pass Bill
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Prosecutors have utilized a multitude of federal and state stat-
utes to deter violent, racist 7 activities.8 Special hate crimes statutes
adopted by states during the past decade, however, are at the center
of a continuing debate about the efficacy of official attempts to deter
interracial violence.9 These statutes increase the criminal penalties
for individuals who commit racial violence, and allow the victims of
such violence to collect civil damages from their persecutors. The
statutes require the prosecution to prove that the accused assaulted,
harassed, or intimidated another person "by reason of"'10 the per-
son's race, religion or national origin.'" In other words, the statutes
require prosecutors to demonstrate that the accused's criminal con-
duct was motivated by racism.
These state hate crimes statutes have largely failed to address
the problem of racially-motivated violence. Commentators attribute
this failure to the onerous burden of proof of the perpetrator's ra-
cial motivation which the statutes require.1 2 The burden of proof
severely limits the number of charges brought and convictions ob-
tained under the statutes.'
3
A number of commentators have proposed that states amend
existing hate crimes statutes to relieve the prosecution of the bur-
Requiring Data Gathering on Hate Crimes, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 9, 1990, at A19. The ADL also
reports that membership in racist organizations, such as the Skinheads, also appears to
be increasing. Paul M. Barrett, Hate Crimes Increase and Become More Violent: U.S. Prosecu-
tors Focus on 'Skinhead" Movement, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1989, at A12.
7 "Racist" will be used in this Comment to connote disregard of another because of
that person's racial, religious, or ethnic background.
8 Federal prosecutors have utilized criminal civil rights statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 242,
§ 245 to bring charges against organized, racist acitivity. State prosecutors have utilized
state laws forbidding mask-wearing, paramilitary training, carrying weapons under cer-
tain circumstances, and meetings to plan the commission of crimes. See generally Gregory
L. Padgett, Comment, Racially Motivated Violence and Intimidation: Inadequate State Enforce-
ment of Federal Civil Rights Remedies, 75J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 103 (1982).
9 See Note, Combatting Racial Violence: A Legislative Proposal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1270,
1271 (1988) [hereinafter Combatting Racial Violence]; Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Bias Cimes:
Unconscious Racism in the Prosecution of Racially Motivated Violence, 99 YALE LJ. 845, 850
(1990).
10 Helen L. Mazur-Hart, Comment, Racial And Religious Intimidation: An Analysis of Ore-
gon's 1981 Law, 18 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 197 (1982).
11 The three elements of race, religion and national origin are most commonly used
in existing hate crimes legislation and therefore will be utilized throughout this Com-
ment. Some states have expanded these categories to include disabled, elderly, or ho-
mosexual persons. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-7.1 (1990).
12 But see Hernandez, supra note 9, at 854 (commentators who emphasize the burden
of proof as the problem with existing statutes are mistaken. The real problem is over-
broad prosecutorial discretion).
13 See Padgett, supra note 8, at 104-05 ("racial and religious violence persists in part
because existing state legislation and state court systems fail to adequately deter and
punish perpetrators of those crimes.").
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den of proving the accused's motive.' 4 Specifically, they propose
shifting the burden of proof on the issue of motive to the accused
through the use of an affirmative defense of no racial motivation
where the accused is white and the victim is a minority.15 While this
proposal may facilitate successful hate crimes prosecutions, it fails
to pass constitutional muster on due process and equal protection
grounds, would neglect to protect many victims of hate crimes, and
may result in the conviction of persons whose actions are not moti-
vated by racism.
Part II of this Comment surveys current hate crimes legislation
at the state level. Part III discusses the problem of proving motive
and the effects of this requirement on criminal prosecutions and, to
a lesser extent, civil damage actions under hate crimes statutes. Part
IV critiques, under due process and equal protection analysis, cur-
rent proposals to shift the burden of proof on the issue of motive.
The Comment concludes with suggestions for improving the effi-
cacy of existing statutes in light of the need to distinguish between
racial motivation and unconscious racism.
II. STATE HATE CRIMES LEGISLATION
State and local prosecutors traditionally enjoyed a poor record
of prosecuting members of racist organizations for crimes against
minorities. As a result, victims of hate crimes relied on federal pros-
ecutors to enforce civil rights statutes against perpetrators of hate
crimes. 16 Federal prosecutions of these crimes lessened the impact
of local prejudices on the initiation of such actions and brought the
full power of the national government to bear on the problem of
hate-motivated violence.
17
The Department of Justice made repeated attempts during the
1960's and 70's to prosecute hate crime perpetrators under federal
civil rights statutes.' 8 Federal prosecutors, however, found these
statutes to be an extremely unwieldy means of dealing with racial
violence. The statutes require proof that the accused specifically in-
14 See generally Marc L. Fleischauer, Comment, Teeth For A Paper Tiger: A Proposal To
Add Enforceability To Florida's Hate Crimes Act, 17 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 697 (1990); Combatting
Racial Violence, supra note 9.
15 Affirmative defenses shift the burden of production and persuasion to the defend-
ant. They can be distinguished from the nearly functionally equivalent device, the statu-
tory presumption, which only shifts the burden of production. See Ronald J. Allen, The
Restoration of In re. Winship, 76 MicH. L. REV. 30, 60 (1977).
16 Padgett, supra note 8, at 114-115.
17 Id. at 118-119.
18 The government utilized the Reconstruction Era statutes embodied in U.S.C.
§ 1983 et. al.
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tended to deprive his or her victim of a constitutionally-protected
right.19
For example, federal prosecutors attempted but failed to con-
vict a white supremacist for the 1980 shooting of Vernon Jordan,
then President of the National Urban League. 20 The accused, a for-
mer member of the Klu Klux Klan and the American Nazi Party,
admitted firing the shot which wounded Jordan. The prosecutor,
however, was unable to convince the jury that the accused thereby
intended to deprive Jordan of his constitutional right of access to
public accommodations. 2 ' The Jordan trial illustrated for many the
difficulties of addressing individual acts of racially-motivated vio-
lence through federal civil rights laws. 22
The failure of federal civil rights statutes to address the prob-
lem of racially-motivated violence signalled to states the need to ad-
dress the problem at the local level. 23 Alarming statistics of a
resurgence of hate crimes in the 1980's, along with a number of
highly publicized violent attacks on minority leaders, 24 also helped
to spur state legislatures to action.
As states recognized the unique dangers of hate crimes, a con-
sensus developed to enact special hate crimes statutes to deal with
the problem of interracial violence. 25 States came to understand
that such violence has insidious effects on entire communities that
go well beyond the suffering of particular victims and their
families. 2
6
States with painful histories of violence between racial and reli-
gious groups viewed the statutes as a possible means of mandating
local prosecutors and juries to impose stiffer penalties on the perpe-
19 But see Padgett, supra note 8, at 127, n.3 (listing successful federal prosecutions
under 18 U.S.C. § 245).
20 Tom Watson, Hate Crimes Bill No Boon for Federal Prosecutors: Skinhead Case in Dallas
was a Justice Department Victory, TEx. LAW., April 30, 1990, at 10.
21 Id.
22 "In federal criminal civil rights cases.. .[y]ou have to show interference with some
federally protected interest or right. There is no federal murder statute .. " Id. (state-
ment of Barry Kowolski, Deputy Chief, Criminal Section, Civil Rights Division of the
Department ofJustice).
23 See generally Mazur-Hart, supra note 10, at 199, n. 16.
24 The trials of white supremacists for the near-fatal shooting of black civil-rights
leader VernonJordan and the killing of prominentJewish talk-show host Alan Berg were
cited by state legislators as reflective of the difficulties inherent in prosecuting under
federal criminal civil rights laws. Watson, supra note 20, at 10.
25 This is in stark contrast to states' collective refusal to curtail the violent activities of
organized racist groups in the 1960's. Padgett, supra note 8, at 115.
26 Crimes between the races can lead to riots and retaliation against innocent victims
as in the case of the Yusef Hawkins attack in New York. They serve as a catalyst for
interracial violence. Combatting Racial Violence, supra note 9, at 1280.
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trators of hate crimes. 27 Even states which had not traditionally ex-
perienced many incidents of racially-motivated violence considered
passage of hate crimes statutes in order to deter hate groups from
relocating in their states and creating racial discord.
28
Oregon became the first state to enact hate crimes legislation
when it passed the Hate Crimes Act in 1981.29 Thirty-two states
have enacted similar legislation to date.30 State legislatures passed
these statutes without much controversy3' and apparently without
much discussion of the difficult burden of proof which the statutes
place upon prosecutors to prove the accused's motive.3 2
The Oregon Act, which is representative of these statutes, pro-
hibits the commission of third degree mischief or harassment and
fourth degree assault or menacing "by reason of the race, color,
religion, or national origin of another person."33 Persons whose
acts are motivated by racism face higher penalties under the Act
than they would under traditional criminal statutes.3 4 In addition,
the Act allows victims of racially-motivated violence to bring civil
actions to recover damages under the Act, irrespective of successful
criminal prosecutions of their victimizers by the state.3 5 This civil
provision is intended to encourage victims of racial violence to bring
27 Padgett, supra note 8, at 117.
28 For example, a PEOPLE magazine article about the settlement of Neo-Nazis in
Northern Idaho was cited by the Idaho legislature as evidence of the threat from out-of-
state racists. Jerry D. Mason &Jeffrey A. Thompson, Comment, Racial and Religious Har-
rassement: Idaho's Response to a Growing Problem, 21 IDAHO L. REV. 85, 86 (1985).
29 See generally Mazur-Hart, supra note 10.
30 A partial list of these statutes follows: CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West 1991);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-121 (1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 460-58 (1990); 1990 FLA.
LAws, ch. 89-133 (1990); IDAHO CODE § 18-7901-7908 (1991); ILL. REV STAT. ch. 38,
para. 12-7.1 (1990); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 88B, § 9-10 (1990); MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
22, § 16 (West 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS, § 750.147b (1991); Mo. REV. STAT. § 574.090
(1990); N.D. CENr. CODE § 12.1-14-04 (1991); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (Consol. 1990);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (Baldwin 1987); OxLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 850 (1990); OR.
REV. STAT. § 166.155 (1987); 27 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2710 (1989); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 11-42-
3 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.080 (West 1990); W. VA. CODE § 61-6-21
(1990).
31 The only real controversy engendered during passage of state hate crimes statutes
involved which categories of minorities would be included under these statutes. See e.g.,
Mazur-Hart, supra note 10, at 198-99 (The Oregon legislature debated but ultimately
rejected the argument to include persons intimidated by reason of sexual orientation,
age, handicap, or political affiliation under the Act.).
32 Combatting Racial Violence, supra note 9, at 1274.
33 1981 Or. Laws 785.
34 Harassment and third degree criminal mischief which are usually Class B misde-
meanors are elevated to Class A misdemeanors under the Act. This means that those
found guilty of hate crime face at least five year penalties. Mazur-Hart, supra note 10, at
200.
35 1981 Or. Laws 785-3(1).
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suits in circumstances where community or prosecutorial prejudices
might preclude criminal charges.36 The Act also provides that local
district attorneys may seek injunctions against persons or groups
that they believe to be engaged in hate crimes activities. 37
Passage of the Oregon Act and hate crimes acts in other states
produced optimistic predictions from many commentators. 38 These
predictions have proven to be at odds with the reality of the statutes'
success. Since the passage of Oregon's statute in 1981, prosecutors
have successfully prosecuted only a handful of persons under the
existing thirty-three hate crimes statutes. In Oregon, prosecutors
have obtained only two criminal convictions under the statute.3 9
Similarly, in Illinois, only two victims have collected civil damages
stemming from racially-motivated attacks. The remaining thirty
states which have enacted hate crimes legislation report no criminal
convictions or civil actions under these statutes.
III. THE PROBLEM OF MOTIVE
Prosecutors must prove a complex set of factors in order to se-
cure a criminal conviction under existing hate crimes statutes. Like
any criminal statute, a typical hate crimes act requires proof by the
government of the accused's mens rea or "guilty mind."'40 Tradi-
tional mens rea elements consist of purpose, knowledge, recklessness,
or criminal negligence.4 1 Hate crimes statutes also require proof
that the accused attacked his or her victim "because of " or "by rea-
son of" that person's race, religion, or national origin.42 This re-
quirement of proof severely undermines the efficacy of existing
statutes and has discouraged prosecutors from charging individuals
under the statutes. Prosecutors often find it impossible to demon-
36 Mazur-Hart, supra note 10, at 202. But see Mason & Thompson, supra note 28, at 87
(Idaho's statute does not contain a provision for a private cause of action. The provision
was removed during the legislative debate on passage because some legislators feared
that the provision might spawn nuisance suits).
37 1981 Or. Laws 785-4.
38 It should be noted that at least two early commentators noted the difficulty which
the requirement of proving the accused's racial motivation might have on the prosecu-
tion of hate crimes defendants. See Mason & Thomson, supra note 28, at 91-94; Mazur-
Hart, supra note 10.
39 See State v. Beebe, 680 P.2d 11, appeal denied, 683 P.2d 1372 (Or. 1984) (defendant
who threw his victim to the ground while shouting racial obscenities is convicted under
Oregon's hate crimes statute).
40 WILLIAM L. BURDICK, THE LAw OF CRIME 150-73 (1946); SANFORD KADISH & STE-
PHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 217-327 (1989).
41 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2).




strate by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused acted
out of racist motives. To a lesser extent, civil plaintiffs also encoun-
ter difficulty in proving the accused's motives by a preponderence of




The problems faced by prosecutors and plaintiffs in proving ra-
cist motive in hate crimes stem principally from the ambiguous na-
ture of motive itself. Courts and commentators often confuse
motive with the distinct concepts of intent, specific intent, purpose
and reason. Motive, however, can be distinguished from these con-
cepts in a number of ways.
Intent probably offers the easiest means for distinguishing mo-
tive from other mes rea elements. Intent is defined as the purpose
to use a particular means to achieve some definite result. Motive, in
contrast, is the cause or moving power which impels action to
achieve that result.44 One's intent is the desire that a particular con-
sequence follow from one's actions. One's motive, however, ex-
plains why that consequence was desired. For example, consider
the case of an individual apprehended in the process of breaking
into a bank.45 The individual likely intends to steal money from the
bank's safe. The individual's motive may be any number of possible
things, from the accumulation of wealth for wealth's sake to
beneficience towards a needy friend. While the law traditionally im-
poses criminal liability on the individual's intent to rob the bank, it
does not make judgements about the "good" or "bad" motives be-
hind that intent.46 The individual in the example will be found
'guilty of burglary as long as the prosecution can prove his or her
intent to rob the bank beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of the
individual's motivation.
Motive also can be distinguished from the concept of specific
intent. Specific intent is defined as "a desire that a chosen conse-
quence follow from the use of a particular means to affect some re-
43 The effect of the requirement of proof of the defendant's racist motive is lessened
in the context of civil action by the lower evidentiary standard of preponderance of the
evidence. However, civil actions remain difficult in states which require civil litigants to
base an action for damages on a successful criminal prosecution by the government. See,
e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A-36.080 (Supp. 1985); Mason & Thomson, supra note
28, at 87 (Washington legislature refuses to provide a civil action under its hate crimes
act for fear of nuisance suits).
44 GLANVILLE L. WILLIAMS, THE MENTAL ELEMENT IN CRIME 10 (1965).
45 This example is adapted from id. at 14.
46 See WARREN R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTt, CRIMINAL LAW 227-28 (2nd ed. 1986).
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sult." 47 One may specifically intend that one's actions result in
particular consequences. For example, reconsider the individual ap-
prehended in the process of breaking into the bank. The individ-
ual's specific intent might be to deprive the bank of its assets. His or
her motive in hoping to deprive the bank of the assets, however,
may be to undermine all capitalist institutions. Many criminal of-
fenses impose liability upon proof of a particular specific intent but,
again, do not traditionally do so upon proof of the individual's
motive.48
While motive is closer to purpose, this concept similarly can be
distinguished. A purpose is defined as "an explicitly aimed-at, ra-
tional goal."' 49 An individual consciously adopts a means to achieve
a particular purpose. The individual's motive for adopting those
means to achieve that purpose, however, is something different. 50
In our example, the individual's purpose in breaking into the bank
may be to steal to provide for a needy friend. His or her motive,
however, might be friendship or beneficence.
Finally, motive can be distinguished from the concept of rea-
son. Reason, like motive, is defined as "the cause which impels ac-
tion for a definite result."' 51 Motive, however, is a particular type of
reason, often the cause of untoward or criminal conduct.52 For ex-
ample, the individual's reason for awakening early on the day of the
bank robbery may be to effectuate a plan to rob the bank. His or her
motive for doing so, however, may be to go to the bank before se-
curity guards arrive in order to avoid detection.
Motive, thus, can be distinguished from the concepts of intent
and specific intent for which the criminal law imposes liability and
from the closely-related concepts of purpose and reason. Motive is
the cause of one's actions, whether one adopts a means to achieve
desired ends or consciously selects those ends. An individual's per-
47 KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 40, at 277.
48 For example, common law larceny requires proof that the defendant not only in-
tended to take another's property, but intended to "steal." LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note
46, at 202.
49 Marjorie J. Weinzweig, Discriminatory Impact and Intent Under the Equal Protection
Clause: The Supreme Court and the Mind-Body Problem, 1 LAW & INEQ. J. 277, 308 (1983).
50 Courts and commentators often mistake motive and purpose. For example, legal
precedent and scholarship devoted to the question of discriminatory legislative intent is
replete with confusion about the respective meanings of purpose and motive, as well
competing definitions of both concepts. See generally J. Morris Clark, Legislative Motivation
and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953 (1978).
51 Weinzweig, supra note 49, at 306.
52 Id. This distinction between reason and motive admittedly may be one without a
difference generally, but it does seem important to keep in mind given the subject of this
Comment, the untoward motive of racism.
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sonality and psyche, therefore, largely determine his or her motives.
The exact contours of motive, accordingly, will be within each indi-
vidual's knowledge alone as personality and psyche are inherently
subjective.
5 3
B. MOTIVE AND ITS COMPLICATIONS FOR THE PROOF PROCESS
The fact that an individual's motive lies peculiarly within his or
her knowledge undermines the ability of prosecutors and plaintiffs
to prove racist motive in hate crimes cases. In a criminal case where
the accused invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination,54 the prosecutor will attempt to convince the jury to
draw inferences of racist motive from the available circumstantial
evidence. 55 Given the very nature of motive, however, members of
the jury are likely to make widely disparate inferences about whether
racist motives animated the accused's behavior. Even if the jury
unanimously establishes racist motive, this conclusion may be inac-
curate or tainted by the jury's own predispositions. In addition, the
rules of evidence and the accused's constitutional rights to a fair
trial will limit the admissibility of some kinds of circumstantial evi-
dence of the accused's motives and the proper inferences to be
drawn by the jury from such evidence. The net result of these
problems is that the requirement of proof of the accused's racist
motive seriously undermines the ability of prosecutors to obtain
convictions under hate crimes statutes in all but the most egregious
cases.
1. The Accuracy and Consistency of Inferences About Motive
Absent an explicit admission of racial motivation by the ac-
cused, prosecutors need to rely on circumstantial evidence of the
accused's reasons for perpetrating the alleged crime. Inferences
about motive which are drawn from circumstantial evidence, how-
ever, may be highly inaccurate given the inherent ambiguity of mo-
tive itself.56 For example, consider the case of a white defendant
who assaults a black stranger.57 Circumstantial evidence that the as-
53 Mazur-Hart, supra note 10, at 205 (citing R. ROBERT M. MACIVER, SOCIAL CAUSA-
TION 17-18 [1942]).
54 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be.. .made to serve as a witness against
himself....").
55 Mason & Thompson, supra note 28, at 93; Combatting Racial Violence, supra note 9, at
1274 n.17.
56 Combatting Racial Violence, supra note 9, at 1274.
57 This example was developed from the attack on Yusef Hawkins, a black teenager,
in Bensonhurst, New York in 1988. See Eric Pace, Bensonhurst Witness Challenged on Use of
Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1990, at B8.
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sault occurred in a neighborhood predominated by whites may lead
the trier of fact to conclude, quite accurately, that racism motivated
the attack. In many cases, however, this conclusion may be incor-
rect. The defendant, in the example, may have attacked his or her
victim because of a paranoid fear of strangers. Proving that racism
rather than paranoia motivated the attacker's actions may be an im-
possible task for prosecutors given the reasonable doubt standard
which requires a far greater quantum of proof than circumstantial
evidence can usually provide.
Prosecutors also have a difficult time proving racist motive be-
cause multiple motives may impel an individual to action, and more
particularly to criminal conduct, at any given time. 58 Discerning
which motive caused an individual to commit a criminal act may be
genuinely problematic. 59 In our example, the white defendant who
assaulted the black stranger may have been motivated by cruelty as
well as racism. Existing hate crimes statutes incorrectly assume that
prosecutors can distinguish the accused's racist motive from his or
her other possible motives. 60 Even where the prosecutor can prove
that racism motivated the individual's actions, the accused will likely
counter with evidence that he or she acted out of some other moti-
vation. The prosecutor then will be required to prove definitively
the existence of racial motivation. 61 To a lesser extent, plaintiffs in
civil damage actions face the same problem under the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard.
A related problem for prosecutors and civil litigants alike is how
to convince ajury that the defendant acted "because of" racial moti-
vation. The exact degree to which racism needs to have motivated
the defendant's conduct is unclear under existing hate crimes stat-
utes. 62 The statutes require proof that the accused attacked his or
her victim "because of" that person's race, religion, or national ori-
gin. As one commentator has pointed out, this standard begs for
58 Fleischauer, supra note 14, at 701.
59 Cognizant of this fact, the law normally refrains from requiring the prosecution to
prove that the individual acted "because of" one motive rather than another. Under
traditional criminal offenses, a prosecutor needs to prove the requisite intent to commit
the act but is not required to prove a particular motive behind the individual's actions.
Of course, this is not to say that motive plays no role in a criminal prosecution. Quite to
the contrary, proof of the individual's motive assists in persuading the trier of fact that
he or she in fact committed the alleged crime.
60 Mazur-Hart, supra note 10, at 217-218.
61 Fleischauer, supra note 14, at 702-703.
62 See William E. Schmidt, Local Setback on Michigan Law on Hate Crimes, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 1990 at A18 (municipal court judge invalidates Michigan's hate crimes statute
on the grounds that the act's evidentiary requirement is void-for-vagueness).
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clarification. 63 The statutes theoretically could require the prosecu-
tor or civil litigant to prove that racial motivation was the sole or
principal cause of the accused's actions. 64 Proving that only racism,
and not some other reason, motivated a defendant's actions imposes
an onerous burden on prosecutors. The proof beyond a reasonable
doubt standard serves as a deliberate preference for the defendant
which, in this context, is difficult if not impossible to overcome. 65
Finally, in order to prove that racism motivated the accused's
particular conduct, the prosecutor will often need to pinpoint when
the racist motive was formed. In any number of cases, racism could
have played little if any role in the beginnings of an altercation but
have been injected into an argument later when tempers flared. 66
Testimony by the accused that he or she used a racial epithet in
anger or that motivation other than racism caused the altercation
would require the prosecution to pinpoint when the accused's racist
motive was formed. Proving the exact point at which an individual's
motive became racist, however, is an impossible task given the na-
ture of motive. The question arises at which point does the pres-
ence of racial motivation trigger the conclusion that the accused
acted "because of" those motives rather than others.
2. Limits on the Admissability of Evidence of Motive
Where there is no circumstantial evidence of the accused's ra-
cial motivation, such as insults hurled during an altercation, the
prosecution will undoubtedly attempt to introduce evidence of the
accused's prior racist conduct. The Federal Rules of Evidence and
the constitutional rights of the accused, however, severely limit the
admissibility of such evidence in hate crimes prosecutions.
First, the Federal Rules of Evidence explicitly prohibit the ad-
mission of character evidence to prove that the accused acted in
conformity therewith during an alleged incident.67 The rationale
behind this prohibition lies in the concern that the jury will convict a
63 Fleischauer, supra note 14, at 703.
64 Theoretically, the statutes also could require prosecutors to prove merely that ra-
cism played some role in motivating the defendant. The debate about the evidentiary
standard intended by the statutory requirement of "because of" or "by reason of" is
long-standing in this context. It is unclear at this point which, if any, standard the courts
have adopted given the small number of reported cases under hate crimes statutes. See
generally, U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) at 165-169 (comments of Senators Thurmond and
Grassley during debate of the Hate Grimes Statistics Act).
65 Allen, supra note 15, at 47.
66 This example is taken from Mason & Thompson, supra note 28, at 93.
67 FED. R. EvID. 404(a) "CHARACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY. Evidence of a person's
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
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defendant for a crime because he or she deserves punishment for
prior bad acts.68 Where character evidence relates to the accused's
motive, however, the Federal Rules allow its admission under cer-
tain narrow constraints. 69 The difference between these two forms
of character evidence can be subtle. In deciding whether evidence is
covered by Fed. R. Evid. § 404 (a) or (b), courts weigh whether the
prejudicial effect of such evidence outweighs its likely probative ef-
fect 70 and the relative explanatory power of such evidence with re-
gard to the accused's conduct.7 1
Courts are especially careful in admitting evidence of the ac-
cused's racist character because of the inherently prejudicial nature
of such evidence. For example, the Sixth Circuit has held that it is
reversible error for a trial court to allow evidence of racial slurs
made by a defendant towards blacks where his victim was Asian. 72
Those courts that have admitted evidence of the defendant's racist
character have done so only where the evidence involves statements
made at the time of alleged criminal activity which reasonably ex-
plain the defendant's behavior.73 In this way, the Rules of Evidence
(1) CHARACTER OF ACCUSED. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) CHARACTER OF A VICTIM. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim
of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution
in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor.
(3) CHARACTER OF A WITNESS. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
rules 607, 608, and 609."
68 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE MANUAL, 7-8
(1991) (arguing that Rule 404(a) prevents the improper inference, "he's done it before,
so he's done or will do it again.").
69 FED. R. EVID. 404(b). "OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissable to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or ab-
sence of mistake or accident."
70 FED. R. EVID. 403. "ExcLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE,
CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
71 FED. R. EVID. 401. "DEFINITION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE. Relevant evidence means
evidence having any tendancy to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence."
72 United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422 (6th Cir. 1986) (defendant appealed his
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(F) for depriving a Chinese-American of his con-
stitutional rights by beating him to death with a baseball bat).
73 United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2d 1183 (10th Cir. 1983) (court holds that evi-
dence that the defendant told police that he thought interracial integration was wrong
shortly after being charged with spraying mace on a black man and white woman is
admissible under § 404[b]).
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limit the ability of prosecutors to introduce evidence of the ac-
cused's racist character even though such evidence directly cor-
roborates the accused's racist motive.
Second, the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of associ-
ation and expression also limit the admissibility of evidence which
prosecutors might seek to use to prove racist motive in hate crimes
prosecutions. Courts generally disfavor the admission of evidence
relating to the beliefs of the accused because liberal admission of
such evidence may chill the exercise of the constitutional rights of
freedom of association and expression. 74 For example, prosecutors
may wish to introduce evidence of the accused's membership in a
racist organization or possession of racist literature.75 While such
evidence is certainly probative of racist motive, its admission can
impinge on the accused's First Amendment rights by punishing him
or her for holding unpopular beliefs about racial, religious, or eth-
nic groups.76 Hence, courts generally limit the use of such evi-
dence, thereby making the prosecutor's burden of proof even more
onerous.
3. The Effects Of The Motive Requirement
The requirement of proof of the accused's racial motivation
raises problems for prosecutors because of the inherent difficulty of
proving motive and the limits on the admissibility of evidence of the
accused's racist character and beliefs. These problems seriously un-
dermine the efficacy of existing hate crimes statutes in a number of
ways.
The clearest effect of the requirement of proof of the accused's
motive is to limit the ability of prosecutors to obtain convictions
under current hate crimes acts, even in the most egregious cases. 77
Where the accused's actions clearly suggest only one explanation,
racial motivation, prosecutors will have a decent chance of securing
a conviction. 78 Conversely, when circumstantial evidence indicates
the existence of mixed motives, the prosecutor's burden of proof
74 Mazur-Hart, supra note 10, at 213 (citing THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREE EXPRESSION 22, 35 (1970)).
75 Mazur-Hart, supra note 10, at 212-213.
76 But see Fleischauer, supra note 14, at 710-11 (arguing that the real chilling effect of
the use of such evidence will be on "lawless action," not the defendant's constitutional
rights).
77 Mason & Thompson, supra note 28, at 93-94.
78 United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1429 (6th Cir. 1986) (court holds that
racial comments by the defendant toward his victim were sufficient evidence to establish




can be nearly impossible. 79 Even where prosecutors obtain convic-
tions under hate crimes statutes, convicted offenders may appeal
their convictions successfully on the grounds that the trial court
erred in admitting evidence of the individual's racist character or
beliefs.
Second, the requirement of proof of the accused's motive de-
ters prosecutors from charging individuals with hate crimes in the
first place.80 Prosecutors often charge individuals who commit
crimes evidencing racial motivation under traditional criminal stat-
utes rather than risk the possibility of failing to prove motive under
hate crimes statutes and face acquital.8 t For example, the District
Attorney of Davis, California reported that he chose not to prose-
cute the fatal stabbing of a Vietnamese student by a white school-
mate under California's Hate Crimes Act because there was no
evidence that the defendant had uttered racial slurs during the
attack.8
2
Finally, the requirement of proof of the accused's motive com-
plicates hate crimes prosecutions because it introduces subjective
factors into the proof process. 83 Due to the difficulty of accurately
inferring motive from circumstantial evidence, a jury must rely on
its own subjective intuitions about the motivations behind an indi-
vidual's conduct.84 This reliance invites inconsistent verdicts in hate
crimes prosecutions. More troubling, it may encourage arbitrary
application of the statutes against disfavored groups for whom the
statutes were intended in the first place. 85 Even where judges give
careful instructions to the jury about not bringing their own views to
bear on the case, jurors are likely to rely on their own prejudge-
ments about interracial violence in deciding whether the accused's
actions were motivated by racism.
8 6
79 Fleischauer, supra note 14, at 702-703.
80 Padgett, supra note 14, at 127, n.163; Combatting Racial Violence, supra note 9, at
1274.
81 Mason & Thompson, supra note 28, at 91-92 (predicting that prosecutors will as-
sess the burden of proof before committing limited public resources to what might
prove to be a difficult prosecution).
82 See U.S. COMMISION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 30.
83 Mazur-Hart, supra note 10, at 204.
84 See Trumble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 782 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(Court troubled by having to intuit the motives of legislators in the context of a discrimi-
natory legislative intent case).
85 One commentator suggests, "...the elements peculiar to the Act[s] could lead to
arbitrary enforcement against persons who, due to their particular lifesyles or race, reli-
gion or beliefs, incur the ire of those empowered to determine who shall be prose-
cuted." Mason & Thompson, supra note 28, at 112.
86 But see Allen, infra note 119, at 352.
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IV. REFORMING CURRENT HATE CRIMES STATUTES
The requirement of proof of the accused's motive ultimately
may defeat the purpose behind the hate crimes statutes and pose
dangers to the victims of racially-motivated violence. State legisla-
tures intended the statutes to serve dual purposes: to send a strong
message of support to minority groups traditionally victimized by
racially-motivated violence and to deter the occurrence of such vio-
lence.8 7 The small numbers of convictions and succesful civil dam-
age actions under the statutes have left minority rights groups
understandably disheartened. While the attitudes of racist groups
towards the statutes are difficult to gauge, these small numbers
surely indicate a failure to deliver the intended message of condem-
nation to these groups. 88 More troubling, the statutes' inefficacy
may encourage racist groups to commit more extremist actions.
In response to these problems, a number of commentators have
suggested that state legislatures reform current hate crimes statutes
to ease the prosecutor's burden of proving the accused's motive.
89
Specifically, these commentators propose that states remove racist
motive as an element of the offense of hate crime and shift the bur-
den of proof on the issue of motive to the accused, thereby creating
a presumption of racial motivation in cases of interracial violence.
90
This proposed reform suffers from fatal constitutional flaws.
The constitutional rights of the accused to proof beyond a reason-
able doubt and equal protection of the law prohibit state legislatures
from adopting this proposal.9 ' More modest, but constitutionally
valid, solutions to the inefficacy of current hate crimes statutes lie in
reducing prosecutorial discretion to charge individuals with hate
crimes, clarifying the standard of causation required for proof of ra-
cist motive, and encouraging civil damage actions.
87 Mason & Thompson, supra note 28, at 86.
88 "What the Klan and the neo-Nazis are doing now can be regarded as a kind of
testing, both of public opinions and of official responses. Official responses which are
tolerant, apathetic or simply ineffective are likely to encourage more extremist action."
SUBCOMMITrEE ON CRIME OF THE HOUSE COMMITEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Increasing Violence
Against Minorities, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1981).
89 See generally Fleischauer, supra note 14; Combatting Racial Violence, supra note 9.
90 Easing the prosecution's burden of proof in this manner is often justified because
facts peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge are difficult to prove. SeeJohn Calvin
Jefferies, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof in the Criminal
Law, 88 YALE LJ. 1325, 1335 (1979). See also Pamela Cowan, Criminal Law-Affirmative
Defenses in the Washington Criminal Code: The Impact of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 51 WASH. L. REV.
953 (1976).
91 These rights are based on the Equal Protection Clause of 14th Amendment and
the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
See, infra notes 105-166 and accompanying text.
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A. SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF
According to proponents, many of the problems which under-
mine current hate crimes laws could be alleviated if state legislatures
shifted the burden of proof on the issue of motive from the prosecu-
tion to the defense. 92 With the reduced burden of proving only one
of the four traditional mens rea mental states, prosecutors undoubt-
edly would obtain more convictions and bring more charges under
the statutes given the increased likelihood of success on the merits
of their cases. Shifting the burden of proof would also encourage
more victims of hate crimes to pursue civil damage actions against
perpetrators of racially-motivated violence.
Under this proposal, state legislatures would remove the ele-
ment of racial motivation from the offense of hate crime and estab-
lish a presumption of racial motivation in any case of violence by a
white defendant against a member of a minority group. Proof by
the prosecution that the crime involved a "white" defendant and a
victim of a minority race, religion, or ethnicity would automatically
trigger the presumption of racial motivation.93
Proponents urge states to create an affirmative defense of no
racial motivation in order to afford white defendants the opportu-
nity to rebut the presumption of racial motive. Like any affirmative
defense, the presumption of racial motivation would shift the bur-
den of production and ultimate persuasion onto the accused.94 In
the event that the accused demonstrated that he or she acted with-
out racial motivation, the jury could acquit the accused of the al-
leged hate crime.95
Proponents cite a number of rationales in support of shifting
the burden of proof of motive to the defendant in hate crimes cases.
While these rationales have some persuasive force, they fail to ade-
quately justify the risk of convicting persons whose conduct was not
motivated by racism which such a proposal would entail.
The most persuasive rationale offered by proponents is that
shifting the burden of proof would increase the number of success-
ful prosecutions and civil actions under existing statutes. Propo-
nents correctly point out that shifting the burden of proof on the
92 See generally Fleischauer, supra note 14; Combatting Racial Violence, supra note 9.
93 Combatting Racial Violence, supra note 9, at 1272.
94 Traditionally, the accused must prove affirmative defenses by a preponderance of
the evidence. Allen, supra note 15, at 60. But see, MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(2)(a); Le-
land v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (upholding Oregon's requirement that the accused
prove the defense of insanity by proof beyond a reasonable doubt).




issue of motive would ease prosecutors' difficult burden of proof.96
Proponents also argue that criminal defendants would have greater
incentives to reveal their inner motives under the reformed statutes
in order to overcome the presumption of racial motivation. 97 The
problem of inferring motive from circumstantial evidence thereby
would be lessened, as would the difficulties of introducing evidence
of the accused's racist character. Finally, proponents argue that
shifting the burden of proof would eliminate the possibility of arbi-
trary and inconsistent verdicts by juries.98 Under the proposed re-
form, ajury would need to rely less heavily on its own intuitions and
subjective considerations about the motivations of the accused. In-
stead, the jury would simply engage in traditional fact-finding,
namely determining whether the defendant is a member of a differ-
ent racial, religious or ethnic group than the victim.
These rationales alone cannot justify shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant. If the state could alter the burdens of proof
in a criminal trial simply to facilitate convictions, many of the rights
of criminal defendants under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment would be eviscerated. In addition, while the accused
undoubtedly can prove his or her motives more ably than a prosecu-
tor, this reason alone cannot justify imposing criminal liability on a
defendant who has trouble disproving racial motivation. 99
At heart, however, proponents' rationales fail because they do
not address the real risk inherent in a "whites only" presumption of
racial motivation. The presumption may facilitate the conviction of
persons who do not commit interracial crimes for racist motives.
Proving that racial motivation did not contribute to one's actions
will be a very difficult task for criminal defendants. For example,
consider the case of a white defendant who wrongfully believed that
a gang of black youths had threatened his life and who shot the
youths unjustly. 00 The accused will have a nearly impossible bur-
den to prove that racism did not motivate his actions, at least in
part. For example, maybe the accused was precipitous in acting to
protect himself because of his own racist attitudes towards his
would-be attackers.
Because of the racist nature of society, everyone suffers from
96 Combatting Racial Violence, supra note 9, at 1274.
97 Id. at 1274, n.17.
98 Mazur-Hart, supra note 10, at 204.
99 See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 (1975).
100 See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986) (court reverses the defendant's
acquittal on attempted murder charges for shooting and wounding four youths on a
New York City subway train).
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unconscious racism. 10 1 The law, however, should not hold individu-
als criminally liable for harboring attitudes that are inescapable to
us all. 102 Instead, the law should deter the most overt manifesta-
tions of racism. 10 3 The proposal to shift the burden of proof fails to
distinguish between individuals whose actions are motivated by ra-
cism and those whose actions are motivated by other factors but in-
fluenced by unconscious racism. The proposed statute would
inevitably lead to the conviction of persons who cannot disprove the
presence of some racial motivation, but who should not be labelled
as hate criminals.'0
4
B. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF
Shifting the burden of proof to the accused on the issue of mo-
tive would also effectively eviscerate the accused's fundamental right
to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Due Process 05 and Pro-
portionality Clauses' 0 6 limit legislative efforts to shift the burden of
persuasion to the accused in criminal cases through the use of af-
firmative defenses.
The Supreme Court recognized the standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt as a constitutional right in In re Winship.'0 7 The
Winship court stated that the prosecution may not shift the burden of
proof to the accused on "the facts necessary to convict" him or her
of the crime charged.' 0 8 In that case, the Court invalidated a New
York juvenile delinquency statute which allowed the prosecution to
prove guilt by a preponderance of the evidence. The Court rea-
soned that the reasonable doubt standard serves as a deliberate bias
in favor the criminal defendant and is therefore essential to the fun-
damental right of innocence until proven guilty. 10 9
101 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987).
102 Id. at 326.
103 As one commentator noted, ".. .the presumption makes the statement that every-
one in the world is racist.. .and equates prejudice with racism." Combatting Racial Preu-
dice, supra note 9, discussed in Hernandez, supra note 9, at 855, n.45.
104 Shifting the burden of persuasion on any issue may be effective at eliciting relevant
evidence, but it also has the effect of resolving close cases against the defendant. See
Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales ofJustice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal
Cases, 86 YALE LJ. 1299, 1333-34 (1977).
105 "No person shall be.. .deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
106 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
107 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
108 Id. at 359.
109 The reasonable doubt rule reflects a general judgment that defendants should be
protected from erroneous convictions. Underwood, supra note 104, at 1322.
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The exact scope of the constitutional right recognized in Win-
ship, however, remains unclear.10 The Court has considered the is-
sue of the reasonable doubt standard in three different cases since
the Winship decision."' These cases have failed to establish a coher-
ent test for deciding which facts are necessary for the prosecution to
prove in order to convict the accused of the crime charged.
In Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Court, purporting to follow the deci-
sion in Winship, invalidated a murder statute requiring the defendant
to prove the affirmative defense of heat of passion.1 2 The Court's
decision suggested that the requirement of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt prohibited the state from shifting the burden of proof to
the defendant on any issue relevant to culpability. 113
Only two years later, the Court essentially reversed its Mullaney
holding. In Patterson v. New York, the Court upheld a statute nearly
identical to the one at issue in Mullaney on the grounds that the state
can shift the burden of proof on any issue not defined as an element
of the offense with which the defendant is charged.' 14 While not
explicitly overruling Mullaney, the Court adopted a formalistic ap-
proach in determining the scope of the reasonable doubt standard.
The Court held that New York did not violate the reasonable doubt
standard as long as it provided the defendant an affirmative defense
to rebut the presumption created by the shift." 5
The Court followed Patterson's lead in Martin v. Ohio where it
upheld a murder statute which allowed the accused to prove the af-
firmative defense of self-defense.' 1 6 The Court stated that the Due
Process Clause does not prohibit a state from shifting to the defend-
ant the burden of proving an element of a crime, as long as the state
removes that issue from the crime's definition.
1' 7
110 See RonaldJ. Allen, Rationality and Accuracy in the Criminal Process: A Discordant Note on
the Harmonizing of the Justices' Views on Burden of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1147, 1148 (1983).
111 Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (Court invalidates a Maine murder stat-
ute shifting the burden of proof on the issue of provocation on the grounds that the
safeguards of the reasonable doubt rule are not rendered unavailable just because a
determination of guilt has been made); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)
(court upholds affirmative defense in New York murder statute); Martin v. Ohio, 480
U.S. 228, reh'g denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987) (court upholds Ohio murder statute on the
same grounds as stated previously in Patterson).
112 Mullaney, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). See supra note 111.
113 See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 90, at 1339 (arguing that the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard is not limited by the characterization of the
state law but applies to some facts extrinsic to the formal definition of the offense).
114 Patterson, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). See supra note 111.
U"5 Id. at 206-207.
116 Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, reh'g denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987).
117 Id. at 232-233.
1991) 677
JAMES MORSCH
Winship and its progeny have produced an enormous amount of
scholarly attention and debate. 118 Commentators have proposed at
least three different approaches to the question of which facts the
state may legitimately shift to the defendant without violating the
right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 1 9 These approaches
suggest the existence of general limitations on the ability of states to
shift the burden of proof on important issues which implicate crimi-
nal liability. 12
0
First, the suggestion of Winship's progeny that the state may
shift the burden of proof on any issue not defined as an element of
the crime is clearly erroneous.' 2 ' If the reasonable doubt standard
only limited states to shifting the burden of proof on such issues,
states could merely remove certain elements from a crime's descrip-
tion and force criminal defendants to prove the absence of these
elements through an affirmative defense. 122 This so-called "ele-
ments test" approach suffers from a number of logical inconsisten-
cies, the principal one being that a state's decision to define an issue
as an element of a crime is essentially arbitrary.'
23
Commentators have suggested a more coherent approach to
this question which involves an examination of the limits on the
types of substantive issues the state may require the accused to
prove. 124 Under this approach, the reasonable doubt standard pro-
hibits the state from shifting the burden of proof on issues that de-
fine the culpability of the criminal conduct at issue. 125 Whether a
state can force the defendant to prove a particular issue depends on
118 See Allen, supra note I10, at 1147.
119 See, e.g., Underwood, supra note 104 (the due process approach); Jeffries & Ste-
phan, supra note 90 (common law substantive approach); RonaldJ. Allen, Structuring Jury
Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: A Unified Constitutional Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94
HARV. L. REv. 321 (1980) (modified substantive approach).
120 That some limitations on legislative discretion exist is undisputed. See Jeffries &
Stephan, supra note 90, at 1348.
121 See Allen, supra note 15, at 48, for a discussion of the so-called "elements theory."
122 Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 90, at 135.
123 Id.; Allen, supra note 15, at 48.
124 See Allen, supra note 119, at 343 ("the fundamental concern with protecting the
defendant's liberty interest articulated in Winship can be fully satisfied only if the proce-
dural safeguard of the reasonable doubt standard is linked to a substantive standard
guaranteeing that the state's determination of criminal conduct is fair and does not carry
the potential for disproportionate punishment."); but see Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable
Doubt Rule and the Meaning ofInnocence, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 457 (1989) (criticizing the sub-
stantive school for looking for an impossible definition for criminal culpability).
125 Note that this approach implies limitations on a state legislature's prerogative to
shift the burden of proof. See Underwood, supra note 114, at 1312 ("The Constitution
imposes very few restraints on the substantive conditions for criminal responsibility,
leaving the field largely open to the policy choices of legislatures.").
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a three-part inquiry. 126
In the first part of this inquiry, a court must determine the effect
of shifting the burden of proof to the defendant through an affirma-
tive defense or some other evidentiary device. 127 If shifting the bur-
den of proof provides the defendant with an opportunity to mitigate
criminal liability which the state already has proven, then the affirm-
ative defense favors the defendant's interests.' 28 Because the state's
action is essentially gratuitous, it does not violate the reasonable
doubt standard.' 29 If the shift disfavors the defendant's interests,
meaning that failure to prove the affirmative defense subjects the
defendant to the maximum penalty under the offense, the state may
have violated the reasonable doubt standard depending on the lia-
bility imposed under that penalty.' 30
Second, a court must decide whether the penalty imposed is
proportional to facts proven by the prosecution. The Eighth
Amendment protects a criminal defendant from punishment which
is not proportional to his or her culpability.' 3 1 A state, therefore,
may only impose criminal liability proportional to the issues proven
beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution.' 32 In determining
whether the state can impose liability absent proof on a particular
issue, courts focus on such factors as the gravity of the offense, the
defendant's culpability in relation to other crimes, and the punish-
ment facing the defendant.' 33 If the criminal liability faced by the
defendant is roughly proportional to his or her culpability, the state
has fully protected the accused against an unwarranted deprivation
of liberty. The state, therefore, can establish an affirmative defense,
subject only a fairness review.'
34
Finally, a court must determine whether the presumption un-
derlying the affirmative defense is accurate or fair.' 35 If the state
126 See Allen, supra note 119, at 341.
127 Id
128 Allen, supra note 15, at 43 ("...permitting the defendant to reduce the sentence he
receives below the permissable level through proof of an affirmative defense is
constitutional.").
129 By its very definition, a gratuitous defense is one which the legislature has the
power to eliminate. See Underwood, supra note 104, at 1325.
130 Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 90, at 1376 (arguing that there must be some limit
on the severity of authorized punishment in order to avoid legislative excess in the inflic-
tion of serious penalties for trivial misconduct).
131 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, supra note 106.
132 See Allen, supra note 15, at 46.
133 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983) (identifying three factors with
which punishments must be compared to determine proportionality).




could merely presume any fact without reference to whether the
presumption is accurate, the state could require the accused to
prove something that is common-sensical.' 36 Since presumptions
are intended to facilitate the fact-finding process, the state must
demonstrate a rational correlation between the facts proven by the
prosecution and those presumed.
37
The proposal to shift the burden of proof on the issue of motive
would violate the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
under this three-part inquiry. First, the state clearly disfavors the
defendant's interests by shifting the burden of proof. The presump-
tion of racial motivation encourages the jury to draw an inference
that it likely would not normally draw and that has not been proven
by the prosecution. In essence, the presumption tells the jury that
racism, more often than not, motivates individuals to attack mem-
bers of another race, religion, or ethnicity.
More profoundly, the presumption also subjects defendants to
the maximum penalties possible under hate crimes statutes. In so
doing, shifting the burden of proof to the defendant raises Eighth
Amendment proportionality concerns. State hate crimes statutes
impose stiffer penalties on perpetrators of racial violence than those
who commit more traditional criminal offenses. Under the pro-
posed statutes, defendants who fail to prove lack of racial motivation
would face increased penalties even though the state has affirma-
tively proved only the elements of these traditional crimes. The
state may justify these penalties in light of the dangers inherent in
interracial violence.' 38 Questions remain, however, regarding
whether these penalties are proportional to the crime committed ac-
cording to the prosecutor's proof.
Finally, and most importantly, shifting the burden of proof
would establish a presumption whose underlying facts are inaccu-
rate. Proof that the accused attacked a member of a different race,
religion, or ethnicity would trigger a finding of racial motivation.
Common-sense, however, suggests no strong connection between
the majority of crimes involving persons of different groups and ra-
136 A presumption in the case of an affirmative defense of lack of racial motivation is
the presence of racial motivation.
137 See Allen, supra note 119, at 323 (describing the elements and application of the
"rationally-connected" test: there must be significant assurances that the presumed fact
is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact upon which it is based); Jeffries &
Stephan, supra note 90, at 1389 (presumed fact must, more likely than not, flow from the
proved fact on which it is made to depend).
138 Combatting Racial Violence, supra note 9, at 1273-74 (arguing that interracial violence




cial motivation.13 9 In conclusion, therefore, the proposal to shift
the burden of proof of motive in hate crimes would violate the con-
stitutional rights of criminal defendants to proof beyond a reason-
able doubt.
C. A "wHITES ONLY" PRESUMPTION OF RACIAL MOTIVATION
Commentators have also proposed that states shift the burden
of proof on the issue of motive only in cases where a white defend-
ant stands accused of attacking a minority.140 Under this proposal,
proof that the accused is white and that the victim is a member of a
minority group would trigger a presumption of racial motivation.
The proponents of this idea would explicitly exempt minority de-
fendants from the presumption or racial motivation. 141 This propo-
sal misunderstands the nature and dangers of interracial violence
and would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 142
1. Rationale for the Proposal
The principal rationale offered by proponents for this proposal
is that, in subjecting white defendants to a presumption of racial
motive, the state would discourage traditional prosecutorial bias
against minorities. Proponents argue that prosecutors use existing
hate crimes statutes against minority members at a higher rate than
against white offenders because of their own prejudices. 143 While
proponents offer no support for this statement, they argue that if
states shift the burden of proof on the issue of motive and thereby
ease convictions, prosecutors might exercise even more vigorous
enforcement against minorities.
While some prosecutors may exercise their own racist beliefs in
making decisions to prosecute individuals for hate crimes, propo-
nents overstate this danger. State and local prosecutors increasingly
have felt pressures to respond fairly to the problem of interracial
139 The "rationally-connected" test requires proof that the proved facts normally evi-
dence the inferred facts of a presumption. For examples of the test's application, see
MacMillan v. State, 358 So. 2d 547, 549-50 (Fla. 1978) (Florida Supreme Court invali-
dates a statute making proof of tampering with utility meters presumptive evidence that
the consumer of the services had done the tampering); State v. Curtis, 372 A.2d 612,
615 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (upholding similar statute as rational).
140 See generally Fleischauer, supra note 14; Combatting Racial Violence, supra note 9.
141 Fleischauer, supra note 14, at 703.
142 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that a
state shall not "... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
143 Fleischauer, supra note 14, at 706.
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violence. These pressures have made prosecutors more sensitive to
the explosive nature of community responses to appearances of bias
against minorities.' 44 In addition, there exist numerous other
means, such as independent watch-dog agencies and specific guide-
lines for the prosecution of hate crime cases, to address the problem
of inadequate enforcement of hate crimes that do not raise the kinds
of constitutional questions implicated in the whites only presump-
tion of racial motivation.
Proponents also argue that the presumption of racial motiva-
tion in cases of violence committed by white defendants against mi-
norities would deter the most egregious forms of racism. Violence
by whites, according to proponents, produces harms not associated
with other forms of interracial violence. 145 For example, consider
the case of the beating of a minority by a white police officer.'
46
Many minorities may consider the beating not an isolated incident
of individual racism but an illustration of the racist nature of white
society. Such incidents regularly create racial violence
themselves.'
47
Proponents' argument in this regard fails in a number of ways.
First, available statistics indicate that interracial violence between
members of minority groups and by minorities against whites occurs
frequently enough to warrant the attention of the criminal justice
system.' 48 For example, racially motivated violence against Asian
Americans often involves members of traditional minority
groups.' 49 Depending on the makeup of the racial majority of the
city or neighborhood where interracial violence occurs, offenders
may be white, black, or another minority. 150
Second, this type of violence poses the same types of dangers as
white-on-minority violence motivated by racism. An attack on a
144 Witness the raucous atmosphere of the trial of six black teenagers accused of as-
saulting and raping a white jogger in Central Park in 1989. Denis Barricklow, UPI GEN-
ERAL NEWS WIRE, Dec. I1, 1990.
145 Fleischauer, supra note 14, at 1271.
146 Consider the beating of Rodney King by members of the Los Angeles Police De-
partment in 1991.
147 The beating death of Arthur McDuffie, a black insurance executive, sparked large-
scale racial rioting in Miami in 1980. When ajury acquitted the two white police officers
accused of beating McDuffie, the black community regarded the trial as proof of the
failure of the criminal justice system to condemn violence against blacks. U.S. COMMIS-
SION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, Confronting Racial Isolation in Miami 242 (June 1982).
148 See generally U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTs, supra note 4.
149 Id. at 11.
150 The U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS reports that 144 of the 156 incidents of
racial attacks in Boston against person of Asian descent were committed by whites. In
Seattle, most perpetrators of similar violence were Hispanic and black. Id. at 38.
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white person by members of a racial minority can create serious ra-
cial tensions and incite violence against minorities which is no less
dangerous than white-on-minority violence.151
Third, proponents fail to define the categories of groups to be
considered "white" or "minority" under the proposal. Existing
hate crimes acts do not require the prosecution to prove the racial
heritage of the accused or his or her victim. Under this proposal,
however, states would need to develop explicit standards to assist
the judge and jury in making consistent determinations of white or
minority status. 152 Even if states could successfully elaborate clear
guidelines for the determination of minority and white status, 53
these standards inevitably will fail to adequately protect persons vic-
timized because of their religion. For example, "whites," like indi-
viduals ofJewish descent, apparently would not be protected under
the proposed statutes even though they are victimized because of
their religious beliefs. Similarly, the proposal would exempt ra-
cially-motivated violence by persons who are racial. minorities but
religious majorities. Finally, however state legislatures define racial
categories, these definitions will neglect situations in which the ac-
cused mistakenly identifies the victim as a minority group member.
In conclusion, the rationale supporting a "whites only" pre-
sumption of racial motivation fails to account for the problems
posed by interracial violence committed by minorities against other
minorities or against whites. Furthermore, problems in defining the
categories of "white" and "minority" persons undermine the pro-
posal. More troubling, the proposal may fail to provide protection
to other significant, historical victims of hate crimes, such as reli-
gious minorities.
151 Consider the controversy which erupted after the attack on a Central Park jogger
in New York City by a gang of black youths. For many, the attack and the criminal trial
which followed indictment of the youths illustrated the city's highly charged racial at-
mosphere, not simply a case of rape. See Andrew Hacker, Blacks' Silence on Blacks, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 1990, at A31.
152 Proponents recognize that such standards will be needed but fail to note the con-
tentious nature of ascertaining which minority groups should be protected under the
statute. See Combatting Racial Violence, supra note 9, at 1272, n.7.
153 This process could undoubtedly provoke heated controversy. Homosexuals and
women, for example, arguably have strong cases for inclusion under the category of
"minority". See Lisa Heinzerling, So Rape Isn't Hatred, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 1990, at B7
(arguing that misogynist attacks on women are hate crimes); 136 Congressional Record,
Vol. 1423, at H1424-1425 (April 3, 1990) (heated debate during passage of the Hate
Crimes Statistics Act about the inclusion of sexual orientation as a category of persons
victimized by hate crime).
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2. The Constitutionality of a "Whites Only'" Presumption
The "whites only" presumption of racial motivation also raises
serious equal protection concerns.154 The Equal Protection Clause
protects individuals from discrimination based on race, religion, na-
tional origin, and sex. In order to guarantee individuals equal pro-
tection, courts subject any classification based on race to strict
scrutiny. 155 Strict scrutiny analysis requires states to prove that such
classifications are narrowly tailored to serve compelling government
interests.- 56 The proposed "whites only" presumption of racial mo-
tive clearly violates this standard.
Proponents, however, characterize the "whites only" presump-
tion as a form of benign racial discrimination intended to benefit
rather than disfavor minorities. 157 While the proposal implicates
equal protection concerns, proponents argue that the proposal
should be subject only to intermediate scrutiny. 158 Intermediate
scrutiny analysis requires the state to demonstrate that racial classifi-
cations are substantially related to important government pur-
poses.' 59  Proponents argue that the presumption of racial
motivation against white defendants will serve the important gov-
ernment objectives of remedying past discrimination in the prosecu-
tion of crimes against minorities and eradicating the most troubling
forms of interracial violence. 160 The use of a presumption disfavor-
ing whites, proponents argue, substantially relates to the achieve-
ment of these objectives. 16 1
The proponents' argument is flawed in at least two ways. First,
154 Current statutes which are not based on these types of classifications by race have
survived equal protection challenges. See State v. Beebe, 680 P.2d 11, appeal denied, 683
P.2d 1372 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (Oregon Supreme Court upholds the state's hate crimes
act on equal protection grounds).
155 Strict scrutiny analysis originated in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1938).
156 Regents of the Univ. of California Board v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (inval-
idating a medical school's admissions quota policy on equal protection grounds).
157 Fleischauer, supra note 14, at 708, n.158; Combatting Racial Violence, supra note 9, at
1282 (benign racial discrimination is any legislation adopted by the majority that disfa-
vors the majority).
158 This notion is based on a reading of the Fourteenth Amendment as intended to
protect discrete and insular minorities rather than individuals generally. According to
the argument, statutes which protect these groups but disfavor whites should be subject
to intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny. See John H. Ely, The Constitutionality
of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 723, 728 (1974), cited with approval in
Fleischauer, supra note 14, at 707-708.
159 See generally LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrIONAL LAw, 16-33 (2d ed.
1988); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
160 Combating Racial Violence, supra note 9, at 1284.
161 Id. at 1285.
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the Supreme Court explicitly has rejected the notion that forms of
benign racial discrimination, such as the proposed presumption,
should be subject to intermediate scrutiny.' 62 All race-based classi-
fications, with the exception of those enacted by Congress, must
pass the strict scrutiny standard for equal protection determina-
tion.163 While states arguably have a compelling interest in remedy-
ing past discrimination and deterring white-on-minority violence,
the proposed "whites only" presumption is clearly not tailored to
serve these objectives.
In determining whether a state has narrowly tailored a statute
to serve its interests, courts will examine whether non-racially based
alternatives might have adequately served those same ends. 164 The
proposed presumption undoubtedly would improve the ability of
prosecutors to obtain hate crimes convictions, but better enforce-
ment of existing statutes arguably would achieve these same objec-
tives. 165 In addition, racial classifications, like the one implicit in the
"whites only" presumption, must remedy specific forms of past dis-
crimination rather than general societal imbalances in order to serve
compelling government interests. 166 The presumption will not
compensate minority members victimized in the past because of
their race. Only past victims who find themselves newly victimized
will have an opportunity to recover civil damages from the persecu-
tors under the statutes. Others, who may understandably take plea-
sure in seeing white defendants serve increased penalties for
committing interracial violence, will hardly be remedied by that
experience.
Second, the presumption of racial motivation violates the Equal
Protection Clause's prohibition on statutes which are either over- or
under-inclusive.' 67 The problem of including religious and other
minorities under the "whites only" presumption clearly indicates
162 City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) ("Absent a searchingjudi-
cial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of
determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in
fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple race politics.").
163 Proponents' argument for the "white's only" presumption falters here by relying
on Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), to support their argument for intermedi-
ate scrutiny. Combatting Racial Violence, supra note 9, at 1283. Fullilove held that Con-
gress may constitutionally adopt set-aside programs for minority contractors without
violating the Equal Protection Clause. The Court has subsequently held that states, in
contrast to Congress, are subject to strict scrutiny analysis for Equal Protection pur-
poses. Croson, 488 U.S. at 490.
164 United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987).
165 Mazur-Hart, supra note 10, at 214.
166 Croson, 488 U.S. at 507.
167 Id. at 506.
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that the presumption suffers from over-inclusion. The proposal will
exclude large groups of persons victimized by racially-motivated vi-
olence, like religious minorites, while including "innocent" white
defendants unable to prove the affirmative defense of no racial
motivation.
3. Suggestions for Change
The proposal to shift the burden of proof to white defendants
in hate crimes prosecutions fails, in large part, because its propo-
nents do not adequately distinguish unconscious racism from racial
animus.168 Any effort to make existing hate crimes statute more ef-
fective must consider how each form of racism plays a role in the
commission and prosecution of hate crimes.
States' failure to clarify the evidentiary standard intended by
the requirement of proof that the accused attacked his or her victim
"because of" racial motivation allows many expressions of racial an-
imus to go unprosecuted under current statutes. The establishment
of a standard to determine whether an individual's acts evidence ra-
cial animus or unconscious racism would assist prosecutors in secur-
ing proper convictions while guaranteeing that offenders free of
racial animus are not unjustly labeled as hate criminals. Possible
standards include determining whether the defendant's sole, pri-
mary, substantial, or appreciable motivation in committing the
crime was racism.
A "sole" or "primary" causation standard for racial motivation
would seriously limit the ability of prosecutors to secure hate crimes
convictions because of the problems inherent in proving a single
motive behind an individual's conduct. 169 As noted previously, indi-
viduals are rarely motivated by any single animus, whether it be ra-
cism or some other factor. Proving racism was the sole or primary
motivation of the defendant, accordingly, would be unduly burden-
some of prosecutors.
An "appreciable" causation standard, on the other hand, would
subject individuals whose conduct was influenced only by uncon-
scious racism to conviction under existing hate crime stautes.t 70 Ra-
168 "Unconscious racism" can be defined as the baggage of prejudgments and stereo-
types that each individual carries with him or her when meeting a person of a different
background. "Racial animus" is the translation of those prejudices into actions which
directly injure persons of these different backgrounds. See Hernandez, supra note 9.
169 The Supreme Court has expressly rejected this standard in the context of discrimi-
natory legislative motive. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
170 But see Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 282 (1983) (Marshall,
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cism may play an appreciable role in much of the interraction
between persons of different backgrounds, particularly when each is
ignorant of the other's background. To adopt an appreciable causa-
tion standard of racial motivation, accordingly, would very likely
subject many such persons to conviction, even though their racism
was unconscious.
A "substantial" causation standard for racial motivation would
appear to be the best means of distinguishing racial animus from
unconscious racism.17' Under this standard, proof by the prosecu-
tor that the defendant's acts were substantially motivated by racism
would result in conviction, regardless of the defendant's claims of
other motivating factors.' 72 At the same time, this standard would
allow defendants whose acts, in fact, were substantially motivated by
factors other than racism to introduce evidence to that effect. For
these reasons, states should amend existing hate crimes statutes to
include a requirement that racism was a substantial cause of the de-
fendant's conduct.
States' failure to provide prosecutors with explicit guidelines
for determining whether a criminal act was motivated by racism also
allows many forms of racial animus to escape prosecution under ex-
isting hate crimes statutes. Without such guidelines prosecutors
must rely on subjective factors in making decisions about whether to
charge an individual with a hate crime.173 These factors will inevita-
bly include prosecutors' own beliefs about the types of incidents
that constitute hate crimes and those that do not. Given the preva-
lence of unconscious racism in society, prosecutors will not bring
hate crimes charges in many cases involving defendants of their own
race, religion, or ethnicity. 174
The establishment of prosecutorial guidelines and oversight
mechanisms would reduce the influence of unconscious racism in
the enforcement of hate crimes statutes. First, states should require
prosecutors to report all crimes where there is evidence that the de-
J., dissenting) (proposing an "appreciable role" analysis in determining discriminatory
legislative motive).
171 This standard has been adopted by courts in determining whether individuals have
violated 18 U.S.C. § 245(b) which prohibits the deprivation of another's constitutional
rights because of that person's race, religion, or ethnicity. See, e.g., United States v. Bled-
soe, 728 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1984).
172 L at 1098 (rejecting defendant's claim that his killing of a black transient was not
solely motivated by racism).
173 Mason & Thompson, supra note 28, at 112.
174 "Unconscious racism causes many prosecutors not to treat racial violence as a seri-
ous crime or consider its victims true victims." Stephan L. Carter, When Victims Happen to
be Black, 97 YALE LJ. 420, 421, n.3 (1988).
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fendant selected his or her victim on account of race, religion, or
ethnicity.17 5 Factors which prosecutors might consider in determin-
ing whether the defendant selected the victim for these reasons in-
clude any racial slurs used during the altercation, the past relations
between the defendant and victim, and neighborhood racial or reli-
gious tensions. 176 Second, states should establish independent
agencies to oversee prosecutorial decisions to charge persons with
hate crimes.' 7 7 These agencies would investigate accusations of bias
by prosecutors and establish regulations for punishing prosecutors
who demonstrate patterns of racially-biased decision-making.
The adoption of mechanisms to encourage victims of hate
crimes to bring civil actions against their persecutors would also
make existing hate crimes statutes more effective.' 78 Such mecha-
nisms might include actual assistance of litigants in the preparation
of their cases and public information directed at informing the gen-
eral public of the existence of civil remedies to hate crimes. Because
of the difficulty of proving racial motivation beyond a reasonable
doubt in criminal cases, the deterence of hate crimes might be more
effectively accomplished through civil damage actions under the
preponderence of the evidence standard.
V. CONCLUSION
Current hate crimes statutes require prosecutors to prove that
the accused acted out of racist motives in committing a criminal act.
Due to the inherently ephemeral nature of motive, this burden has
proven extremely difficult for prosecutors to meet. Only a small
number of persons have been successfully prosecuted under the
statutes, while many others whose acts evidenced racial animus have
escaped hate crimes prosecution.
In response, commentators have proposed that states shift the
burden of proof on the issue of racial motivation to white defend-
ants who attack members of minority groups. While this proposal
would undoubtedly enable prosecutors to obtain more hate crimes
convictions, it also would violate the Due Process and Equal Protec-
175 See, e.g., Special Order, Community Disorders Unit, Boston Police Dept., S.O. No.
78-28, April 7, 1988 (reprinted in U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 30).
See also, MN. STAT. ANN., Ch. 626.5531 (West 1991) (police reporting requirements for
crimes evidencing hate).
176 Id. at 37.
177 Hernandez, supra note 9, at 855-860.
178 Civil damage actions may be the preferred option for many victims of hate crimes.
See Robb London, Sending a $12.5 Million Message to a Hate Group, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21,
1990 at B20 (jury awards $12.5m in civil damages to relatives of an Ethiopian man
beaten to death by members of the White Aryan Resistance).
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tion Clauses and subject persons influenced by unconscious racism
to unwarranted convictions.
The solutions to the problems experienced by current hate
crimes legislation lie in distinguishing racial animus and uncon-
scious racism. First, states must adopt a dearer standard of proof of
the defendant's motivation. States should require prosecutors to
prove that racism was the substantial motivating force behind the
defendant's conduct. Second, states must provide guidelines and
oversight over prosecutorial decisions to charge individuals with
hate crimes. These decisions may be influenced by the racism of
prosecutors themselves unless checked by states. Finally, states
should establish agencies to encourage victims of hate-motivated vi-
olence to bring civil damage actions. Only when states adopt these
measures will we begin to resolve the inherent problems of the mo-
tive requirement of existing hate crimes statutes.
JAMES MORSCH
